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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43660 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-10282 
v.     ) 
     ) 
MORRIS BENNY CODY JR, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 “Based on his low risk to re-offend and amenability to treatment, coupled with his 
very minimal criminal history and positive factors such as a stable employment history, 
family support, and no known physical, mental health, or substance abuse issues,” the 
presentence investigator recommended the district court place Morris Cody on 
probation.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.20.)  After all, 
Mr. Cody was a low risk to reoffend, scoring only 10 on the LSI-R evaluation.  Even the 
prosecutor agreed that no more than a period of retained jurisdiction was necessary.   
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 And yet, the district court, focusing only on the nature of Mr. Morris’s conduct, 
thus failing to give adequate consideration to all the factors in his character which 
showed incarceration was not necessary to protect society or effectuate rehabilitation, 
imposed and executed an eighteen-year unified sentence, with three years fixed.  As a 
result, the district court’s sentence fails to serve all the goals of sentencing.  Therefore, 
Mr. Cody appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
and executed his sentence, rather than placing him on probation.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Cody had been a productive member of society for most of his 59 years.  
(See generally PSI).)1 He is an honorably-discharged veteran of the United States 
Army.  (PSI, p.11.)  He has earned his associate’s degree.  (PSI, pp.10-11; see also 
PSI, pp.77-80 (some of Mr. Cody’s college transcripts).)  He had worked consistently for 
the State of Idaho for 25 years.  (PSI, pp.11-12.)   
And yet, Mr. Cody also had his struggles.  He had been convicted of 
misdemeanor driving under the influence.  (PSI, pp.5-6.)  He and his wife had also 
separated.  (See, e.g., PSI, p.9)  But Mr. Cody also worked to redeem himself.  He 
fulfilled all the terms of the withheld judgment in his DUI case, which resulted in that 
conviction being dismissed.  (PSI, p.13; see also PSI, p.6 (noting Mr. Cody has no other 
criminal history).)  He and his wife have also been making efforts to reconcile their 
marriage.  (PSI, pp.9, 19.) 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file “Cody 
43660 psi.”   
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 However, during the period of separation from his wife, Mr. Cody moved in with a 
friend and colleague.  (PSI, p.19.)  Mr. Cody became infatuated with her, despite her 
assertions that she did not want a romantic relationship.  (See PSI, p.3 (discussing 
several incidents where Mr. Cody made unwanted advances).)  Then, he engaged in 
what he recognized to be an “unexcusable” act.  (PSI, p.15.)  While his roommate was 
asleep, he started having intercourse with her.  (PSI, p.3.)  He recognized that this “was 
not only a betrayal of trust and friendship, it was also a violation/intrusion of her body.”  
(PSI, p.16.)  He offered his sincere apologies for the harm he realized he had done.  
(PSI, pp.15-16; Tr., p.31, L.1-3.)  He accepted responsibility for his actions and pled 
guilty to a charge of rape.  (See, e.g., R., p.20.)  He also agreed to pay restitution in this 
case.  (See Tr., p.18, Ls.2-25 (Mr. Cody not objecting to the prosecutor’s initial request 
for restitution or its request to keep that matter open while his roommate finished 
arranging for counselling).) 
 In addition to pleading guilty, Mr. Cody agreed to cooperate with the 
psychosexual evaluation (hereinafter, PSE) process, and the State agreed, if that 
evaluation concluded he was a low risk to reoffend, it would recommend a sentence 
with only three years fixed and a period of retained jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.5, L.14 - p.6, 
L.2.)  The PSE did, in fact, conclude Mr. Cody presented a low risk.  (PSI, p.32.)  As 
part of his explanation of that conclusion, the PSE author listed 22 protective variables 
which indicated Mr. Cody was a good candidate for release and treatment.  (PSI, p.61.)  
The PSE author also concluded Mr. Cody was moderately amenable to treatment, 
meaning he is as amenable to treatment as most other offenders.  (PSI, pp.66, 70.)  As 
a result, the PSE author recommended that Mr. Cody receive community-based sex 
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offender treatment, explaining he was “more likely to comply with supervision than the 
typical sexual offender, [because of] his willingness to acknowledge his sexual offense, 
limited static risk variables, limited dynamic risk variables, numerous protective 
variables, and expressed willingness to comply with treatment.”  (PSE, pp.65, 68.) 
 The PSI author reached a similar conclusion.  (PSI, p.20.)  It noted that Mr. Cody 
had “provided a thoroughly completed presentence questionnaire form.  He was 
cooperative throughout the process.”  (PSI, p.19.)  The PSI author also noted that 
Mr. Cody scored only 10 on the LSI-R evaluation, which placed him in the low risk 
category.  (PSI, p.16.)  Therefore, the PSI author recommended Mr. Cody’s sentence 
be suspended for a period of probation “[b]ased on his low risk to re-offend and 
amenability to treatment, coupled with his very minimal criminal history and positive 
factors such as a stable employment history, family support, and no known physical, 
mental health, or substance abuse issues.”  (PSI, p.20.)  Defense counsel joined those 
recommendations for probation.  (Tr., p.30, Ls.12-15.) 
Despite recognizing that Mr. Cody’s expressions of remorse were sincere and it 
is unlikely he would reoffend, the district court rejected the recommendation for 
probation, and even refused to, as the State recommended, retain jurisdiction over 
Mr. Cody.  (Tr., p.31, Ls.18-19; Tr., p.33, Ls.22-23; Tr., p.35, Ls.4-5.)  It made that 
decision by focusing on punishment and deterrence as they related to the nature of the 
crime.  (Tr., p.32, L.3 - p.35, L.7.)  As such, it imposed and executed a unified sentence 
of fifteen years, with three years fixed, on Mr. Cody.  (Tr., p.34, L.22 - p.35, L.2; 
R., pp.36-39.)  Mr. Cody filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  
(R., pp.45-46.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by executing Mr. Cody’s sentence. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Executing Mr. Cody’s Sentence 
 
In order to reach a reasonable sentencing decision, the district court needs to 
weigh the objectives of sentencing in light of the defendant’s character.  State v. Miller, 
151 Idaho 828, 835 (2011); see also I.C. § 19-2521.  A sentence, including the decision 
of whether or not to suspend the sentence, should be crafted so that it serves the four 
recognized objectives of sentencing:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and 
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 
(1993).  The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider.  Id.  
However, each of the other objectives influences whether the sentence will protect 
society in a particular case.  See id.; I.C. § 19-2521.  To that point, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the 
imposition of the criminal sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), 
superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).   
Similarly, the Legislature has instructed, the district court “shall deal with a 
person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment 
unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, 
character and condition of the defendant,” imprisonment is deemed appropriate.  
I.C. § 19-2521(1) (emphasis added).  Therefore, only by considering all these factors 
together, rather than any in a vacuum, does the district court reach a reasonable 
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sentencing decision.  Furthermore, insufficient consideration of these factors has been 
the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases.  See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State 
v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 
354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990).   
While it is true, the nature and circumstances of this offense are concerning, that 
does not end the inquiry.  (Compare Tr., p.31, L.17 - p.35, L.18 (the district court 
stopping its analysis at that point).)  The next question, which according to the 
Legislature and the Idaho Supreme Court, is the important question, is whether, 
considering that factor alongside the character of this defendant, incarceration is 
necessary to protect the public.  See I.C. § 19-2521; Miller, 151 Idaho at 835; 
Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.  The record in this case reveals the answer to that 
question is “no.”   
The PSI author summarized the reasons for that answer in its recommendation 
for probation:  that conclusion is “[b]ased on his low risk to re-offend and amenability to 
treatment, coupled with his very minimal criminal history and positive factors such as a 
stable employment history, family support, and no known physical, mental health, or 
substance abuse issues.”  (PSI, p.20.)  That conclusion is borne out by the fact that 
Mr. Cody only scored 10 on the LSI evaluation. (PSI, p.16.)  The district court even 
noted that “[t]here are only a small percentage of defendants who come through this 
courtroom on whatever kind of charge [who] have an LSI score that’s lower than that.”  
(Tr., p.33, Ls.16-19.)   
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In addition to the factors highlighted by the PSI author, the PSE author identified 
several reasons Mr. Cody should have been placed on probation:  he was more likely to 
be successful on probation “based on his willingness to acknowledge his sexual 
offense, limited static risk variables, limited dynamic risk variables, numerous protective 
variables, and expressed willingness to comply with treatment.”  (PSI, p.68.)  
Specifically to the point of protective variables, meaning those factors in Mr. Cody’s 
character that demonstrate he is less likely to be a threat to society, the PSE author 
identified twenty-two separate such factors.  (PSI, p.61.) 
While some of the protective factors identified are duplicative of those highlighted 
by the PSI author, several others are unique to the PSE.  For example, Mr. Cody has a 
“Propensity to engage in Healthy and Pro-social Recreational Activities,” had “a Stable 
Childhood with No Family History of Psychological or Substance Abuse Issues,” had 
“No History of Discipline Issues in School” and has “No History of Supervision Failure.”  
(PSI, p.61.)  To that last factor, Mr. Cody has, in fact, shown he can be extremely 
successful while on supervision, as he fulfilled the terms of his withheld judgment, such 
that he earned the dismissal of his prior DUI conviction.  (PSI, pp.5-6, 19.)   
There are still more factors about Mr. Cody’s character which reveal why, when 
considering all the goals of sentencing in light of Mr. Cody’s character, incarceration is 
not appropriate in this case.   For example, he is an honorably-discharged veteran of 
the United States Army.  (PSI, p.11.)  He has earned an associate’s degree and has 
taken various other collegiate level courses.  (PSI, pp.10-11, 77-80.)  He has a stable 
employment history, working 25 years in the same job.  (PSI, pp.11-12.)  He also has a 
support network of family and friends.  (PSI, pp.22-31, 76.)  That network is expanding, 
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as Mr. Cody is working with his wife to reconcile their marriage.  (PSI, p.9.)   Mr. Cody 
has also repeatedly expressed his remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions.  
(PSI, pp.5, 15-16; Tr., p.30, L.19 - p.31, L.14.)  The district court even acknowledged 
that his statements were sincere.  (Tr., p.31, Ls.18-19.)  Such expressions are empirical 
examples proving the PSE author’s conclusion that Mr. Cody is amenable to treatment 
as they are critical first steps of the rehabilitation process.  See State v. Kellis,           
148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). 
The Legislature and the Idaho Supreme Court require that all of these factors, 
which demonstrate the character of the person before the district court for sentencing, 
be considered alongside the nature of the offense.  The district court’s job at that point 
is to decide whether, in light of everything, a sentence with the primary goal of 
protecting society and the foremost consideration of rehabilitating the defendant, along 
with considerations of deterrence and punishment to further the primary goal of 
protection, can be achieved without incarceration.  I.C. § 19-2521(1); Charboneau,    
124 Idaho at 500; McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240.  The district court did not do that is this 
case.  Instead, it focused on the nature of the crime in a vacuum, evidenced by its focus 
on deterrence and punishment for the offense.  (See Tr., p.34, Ls.3-5.)  The result is a 
sentence which does not further all the goals of sentencing, and so, constitutes an 
abuse of the district court’s discretion.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Cody respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 5th day of April, 2016. 
 
      ________/s/__________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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